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Assessment Operational
How Personal Judgment Influences Scenario Development: an Example
for Future Rural Development in Europe
Marc J. Metzger 1,2, Mark D.A. Rounsevell 3, Harm A.R.M. Van den Heiligenberg 4,5, Marta Pérez-Soba 2, and 
Paul Soto Hardiman 6
ABSTRACT. Scenarios of alternative plausible futures have been used extensively to explore the potential
effects of socioeconomic and environmental change. The ultimate objective of any explorative scenario
exercise is to assess the variation in possible futures to provide insights into the range of potential outcomes.
These results provide stakeholders with guidance for policy development, planning, and management. We
explore how personal judgment can influence scenario development. Scenarios for the future of European
rural regions are used to explore alternative outcomes under a public interventionist future and a market
liberalization oriented future. A transparent qualitative framework is used to identify differences in
outcomes based on personal judgment. Results show that, for both scenarios, there are plausible mechanisms
that can lead to similar positive or negative outcomes. Choosing a single process per scenario, based on
personal judgment and interpretation, can therefore greatly influence scenario outcomes and limit the range
of uncertainty that is covered by the scenarios. The exercise shows the importance of making these judgments
explicit in scenario development, especially when exploring broad consequences of alternative policy
directions that may be based in political worldviews.
Key Words:  Common Agricultural Policy reform; explorative scenarios; personal judgment; rural
development; uncertainty
INTRODUCTION
The main socioeconomic drivers of environmental
change are global in scope and are inherently
unpredictable (MA 2005, IPCC 2007). Scenarios
that provide alternative images of how the future
may unfold can act as an integration tool in assessing
the effects of future environmental and social
change (Zurek and Henrichs 2007, Rounsevell and
Metzger 2010). Although we cannot attach a
probability of occurrence to any given scenario,
scenarios help to stimulate open discussion in the
policy arena about potential futures (Van der
Heijden 2005). Over the last decade, a large number
of studies have developed scenarios to explore
potential future changes at different geographical
scales. Rashkin (2005) gives an overview of recent
global exercises, including the climate change
scenarios of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report on
Emissions Scenarios (Nakicenovic et al. 2000) and
the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA 2005).
At the subglobal scale, many scenarios studies have
been conducted for the European Union (EU). We
compare the objectives and characteristics of some
of these scenarios (Table 1).
Despite the increased use of scenarios in global
change science, the associated terminology remains
loosely defined. We have therefore included a list
of definitions of the most important terminology
used (Table 2).
Although scenario studies have been used for
different objectives, there is considerable overlap in
the conceptual frameworks adopted to structure
these scenarios (i.e., scenario logic) and the models
applied to quantify the scenario outcomes. For
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Table 1. Overview of a range of existing scenario studies for the European Union.
Name Objective Extent Temporal
scale
Spatial
resolution
Quantified
variables
Scenario names
ATEAM† (Rounsevell et al. 2006)
Land use scenarios
for models to assess
effects on ecosystem
services
EU15
Norway
Switzerl-
and
2020,
2050,
2080
% cover in
10 arc minute
grid cell
Land use: urban,
cropland,
grassland,
permanent crops,
bio fuels,
abandoned land
Global Economic – A1
Regional Economic – A2
Global Environmental – B1
Regional Environmental – B2
Prelude‡ (EEA 2007)
Inspire and inform
discussion
EU25,
Norway,
Switzerl-
and
Annual
time
steps
2005-2035
% cover in
10 arc minute
grid cell
Land use: urban,
cropland,
grassland,
permanent crops,
bio fuels,
abandoned land
Great Escape – Europe of Contrasts
Evolved Society – Europe of
Harmony
Clustered Network – Europe of
Structure
Lettuce Surprise U – Europe of
Innovation
Big Crisis – Europe of Cohesion
ALARM§ (Settele et al. 2005; I. Reginster, M. Rounsevell, F. Riguelle, T. R. Carter, S. Fronzek, I. Oman, J. H.
Spangenberg, A. Stocker, A. Bondeau, T. Hickler unpublished manuscript)
Land use scenarios
for models to assess
effects on
biodiversity
EU25,
Norway,
Switzerl-
and
Annual
time
steps
2006-2080
% cover in
10 arc minute
grid cell
Land use: urban,
cropland,
grassland,
permanent crops,
bio fuels,
abandoned land
Growth applied strategy (GRAS)
Business as might be usual
(BAMBU)
Sustainable European development
goal (SEDGE)
Shock in energy price level
(BAMBU-SEL)
Cooling under thermohaline collapse
(GRAS-CUT)
Contagious natural epidemic
(BAMBU-CANE)
SENSOR| (Kuhlman 2008, Helming et al. 2008)
Policy scenarios to
illustrate and
quantify
consequences of
specific European
policies on land use
and a number of
indicators
EU27 2025 NUTS2/3† † 
socioeconomic
data, 1 km
land use
86 social and
environmental
indicators and
land use functions
Land use: 13
classes
Reference: Reference growth, High
growth, Low growth
Policy: Bioenergy, EU Financial
Reform, Biodiversity, Forest
management, Transport
EURURALIS¶ (WUR/MNP 2008)
(con'd)
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Tool for the support
of policy discussions
on long term
changes and policy
challenges in the
rural areas of Europe
EU27 Annual
time
steps
2000-2030
NUTS2/3
socioeconomic
data, 1 km
land use
Commodities:
cereals, sugar,
oilseeds,
horticulture, other
crops, cattle, pork
& poultry, dairy,
processed
Land use: 13
classes
Global Economy
Global Cooperation
Continental Market
Regional Communities
ESPON# (ESPON 2007)
Scenarios for
European Spatial
Developing Planning
EU27 2015 and
2030
Mainly
NUTS
regions
Many
socioeconomic
variables
1 reference scenario
20 thematic scenarios
2 policy scenarios
1 prescriptive scenario
†
 Advanced Terrestrial Ecosystem Analysis and Modelling; http://www.pik-potsdam.de/ateam/
‡
 Prospective Environmental Analysis of Land Use Developments in Europe;
 http://www.eea.europa.eu/prelude
§
 Assessing Large scale Risks for biodiversity with tested Methods;
 http://www.alarmproject.net/alarm/
|
 Sustainability Impact Assessment: Tools for Environmental, Social, Economic Effects of
Multifunctional
 Land Use in European Regions; http://www.sensor-ip.org/
† †
 Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics;
 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/nuts/home_regions_en.html
¶
 EURURALIS; http://www.eururalis.eu
#
 European Spatial Planning Observation Network; http://www.espon.eu
example, Busch (2006) grouped 24 scenarios from
six global and European studies under just four
broad labels: global markets, global society,
continental barriers, and regional sustainability. In
addition, several studies share a common pedigree.
The PRELUDE and ALARM scenarios stem from
the ATEAM methods (Ewert et al. 2005, Rounsevell
et al. 2005, 2006), and the CLUE model (Verburg
et al. 2008, 2010) has been used in both SENSOR
and the EUruralis to provide the spatial
disaggregation of land use change (Table 1).
There are also signs of common reasoning in
storyline interpretation to assess the scenario
outcomes among European scenario studies. For
example, both ATEAM (Schröter et al. 2005,
Rounsevell et al. 2006) and EUruralis (WUR/MNP
2008) project significant land abandonment in
unfavorable production regions when trade barriers
and agricultural subsidies are abolished. Although
such a future is consistent with recent observations,
e.g., in European mountain regions (MacDonald et
al. 2000), reductions in subsidies need not
necessarily lead to wide-scale abandonment. In
New Zealand, for example, radical policy reform in
1984 led to the complete abolishment of agricultural
subsidies. After an initial difficult period, the sector
managed to redevelop through both diversification
and the reduction of inputs in marginal regions, with
the result that little land was abandoned (Smith and
Montgomery 2004, MacLeod and Moller 2006).
The objective of any explorative scenario exercise
is to assess the variation in possible futures to
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Table 2. Definitions of the most important scenario terminology used in this paper.
Scenario term Definition
Driver Any natural or human-induced factor that directly or indirectly causes a change.
Scenario
assumptions
A coherent and internally consistent set of principles about key drivers and relationships, which can
consist of both narrative storylines and trends of key drivers.
Scenario logic The conceptual framework to structure alternative scenarios based on the most important and uncertain
drivers.
Scenario
(outcome)
A plausible image of the future, based on the qualitative or quantitative interpretation of a set of
scenario assumptions, which can be presented as narrative storylines or quantitative figures and maps.
Storyline A qualitative description of the future that can be used to describe both scenario assumptions and
scenario outcomes. Storylines are often narratives but could also be images or animations.
provide insights into the range of potential outcomes
(Alcamo 2001, Van der Heijden 2005, Zurek and
Henrichs 2007, Rounsevell and Metzger 2010).
These results provide stakeholders with guidance
for policy development, planning, and management.
Generally speaking, the scenario logic is used to
ensure sufficient coverage of variation in future
developments. However, outcomes are also
influenced by differences in storyline interpretation
and quantitative modeling assumptions. Variation
in outcomes is reduced by common paradigms, as
illustrated for land abandonment, whereas
alternative modeling methods can enhance
variation. Busch (2006) has shown that, for similar
narrative scenarios, global models have contrasting
outcomes for Europe compared with European-
scale studies.
The convergence of European scenarios is an
undesirable development because it ultimately
limits the range of possible outcomes that can be
explored and may not reflect the full diversity of
plausible futures. This is especially important when
investigating alternative policy directions, each of
which can have multiple outcomes depending on
the uptake or success of the policy. For example,
this is the case for rural regions, given likely changes
in policies for rural development, including the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The
consequences for people living and working in rural
regions depend on complex and dynamic processes
that are determined by a range of driving forces,
including demographic, socioeconomic, technological,
and environmental change. This implies that for
rural scenario studies, it is important to interpret the
future outcomes of alternative policy directions,
which rely heavily on personal judgment. Set
paradigms must be avoided and personal judgments
of the outcomes of different policy directions should
be made explicit to provide stakeholders with
transparent information to evaluate suitable policy
options (De Vries and Petersen 2009).
Here, we present a novel concept in scenario
development to explicitly address and analyze
judgment in scenario development. Using a set of
scenarios for the future of European rural regions
as an example, we explore how alternative
worldviews influence the interpretation of scenario
outcomes. Although our study is based on
qualitative reasoning, we discuss the implications
of this approach for quantitative modeling.
EXPLORING PERSONAL JUDGMENT IN
RURAL DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS
Developing scenarios for rural Europe
As part of the Foresight Analysis of Rural Areas Of
Europe (FARO-EU) project for the European
Commission, we developed contrasting scenarios
for the future of European rural regions. The
development involved two stakeholder workshops
with approximately 15 EU policy makers from
Directorate General (DG) Agriculture and DG
Ecology and Society 15(2): 5
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss2/art5/
Regio and a few national policy makers seconded
to Brussels. During the first workshop we asked the
policy makers to individually score the importance
of a range of drivers and policy issues that could
affect rural regions. The outcomes of this
consultation were then discussed in plenary. In
addition, we presented the policy makers with a
number of scenarios and asked them to discuss each
scenario's relevance for the FARO-EU project
(Table 3). During a second workshop we presented
the policy makers with initial results, and asked for
specific feedback and comments, which were used
to improve the scenarios.
Although business management textbooks discuss
scenario methods (e.g., Van der Heijden 2005),
explicit descriptions of the methods are surprisingly
rare in the scientific literature and can lead to
confusion, especially when concepts are also poorly
defined. We summarize the scenario development
as following five stages (Fig. 1) that are consistent
with the terms defined by us (Table 2).
Stage 1 was to define the focal question and spatial
boundaries. These were defined by the project aims:
to explore the future of European rural regions,
focusing specifically on working and living
conditions. The time frame of the project was
determined after the first policy workshop.
Although the policy makers thought that climate
change could have serious effects in rural regions,
they felt that a time frame greater than 25 years
would have limited policy relevance. It was
therefore decided to focus on 2030. We then used
the results from the policy workshop to construct a
list of relevant drivers, which was Stage 2. Relevant
drivers were identified for the society, technology,
economy, environment and policy/governance
(STEEP) categories, but we decided to exclude
environment and society drivers. Although these
categories could influence working and living
conditions in rural regions, we see them as scenario
outcomes, rather than drivers that can be described
in the scenario assumptions.
The stakeholders identified the future of the CAP
after 2013 as one of the most important and
uncertain factors influencing future working and
living conditions in European rural areas. However,
the project did not envisage the ex ante evaluation
of specific policy reforms (cf. Van Ittersum et al.
2008), but rather explored the consequences of
broad policy directions. In Stage 3, we therefore
structured our scenarios on two different
worldviews. The first is a world based on a strong
belief that the public sector must intervene to solve
social, economic, and environmental problems to
achieve social, economic, and territorial equity and
environmental protection. This we label the
Muskateers ‘all for one and one for all’ scenario.
The second world vision is a world in which there
is a strong belief that market liberalization will
achieve solutions to social, economic, and
environmental problems by strengthening competitiveness
in the global economy. This we label Marketeer
scenario.
In Stage 4, the narrative storylines for the Muskateer
and Marketeer scenario assumptions were
developed for the future trends in policy,
governance, economy, and technology (Table 3).
These storylines were then used to explore the trends
of the important drivers affecting change (Table 4;
cf. Nakicenovic et al. 2000, Rounsevell et al. 2006).
Following traditional scenario methods (Rounsevell
et al. 2006, Zurek and Henrichs 2007), the trends in
the drivers (Table 4) are used in Stage 5 to make
projections for specific indicators related to rural
development, either qualitatively (cf. MA 2005) or
using quantitative numerical models (cf. Rounsevell
et al. 2006). However, it is difficult to define
consistent rules to assess the consequences of
alternative narratives objectively without reflecting
political ideologies or personal beliefs. For
example, as illustrated in the introduction, there are
alternative plausible hypotheses about the
consequences of abolishing agricultural subsidies.
Similar contrasting outcomes can be devised for
employment, social cohesion, and the environment,
all based on valid but contrasting underlying
assumptions imbedded in personal beliefs or
worldviews.
These discussions led us to construct a framework
for making explicit personal judgments of scenario
implications, allowing us to explore its potential
influence on future outcomes.
Assessing personal judgment in scenario
outcomes
A consistent analysis of personal judgment in
scenario outcomes (Stage 5 in Fig. 1) becomes
possible when the scenario assumptions are
interpreted from contrasting perspectives. A
supporter of the worldview has high expectations
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Table 3. Scenario principles for alternative plausible changes affecting European rural regions.
Public intervention - Muskateer Market liberalization - Marketeer
General principles
• There is a strong belief that the public sector must
intervene to solve social, economic, and environmental
problems.
• There is a strong belief that market liberalization will
achieve solutions to social, economic, and environmental
problems.
• The main aims of public intervention are social-
economic equity, territorial equity, and environmental
protection.
• The main aim of market liberalization is to strengthen
competitiveness in the global economy to protect
socioeconomic achievements.
• Subsidies, tariffs, public investment, and regulation are
important instruments to achieve these aims, and are paid
for by society.
• Low taxation, light bureaucracy, market flexibility, and
deregulation are important instruments to achieve these
aims.
Policy
• EU and national policies focus on supporting the
Sustainable Development Strategy (EC 2009), focusing
on the synergy between economic, social, and
environmental goals.
• EU and national policies are based on the economic
dimensions of the Lisbon strategy (EC 2004) and the aim
of Europe leading the world economy.
• Policies aim for integrated development at a regional
scale.
• Policy intervention is limited and aims to strengthen
European competitiveness.
• Special attention is given to supporting economically
and socially marginal areas, and ecologically valuable
areas.
• Special attention is given to leading economic regions.
• The EU continues to protect vulnerable agricultural
sectors from the global market. When appropriate, income
support is replaced by a system of targeted payments to
farmers and other landowners for their contribution to the
improvement of public goods.
• The EU abolishes export subsidies, import tariffs,
domestic subsidies, milk and sugar quotas, and cohesion
policies.
• Multifunctionality of rural areas is supported by public
investment (e.g., in infrastructure and information and
communication technology [ICT]) and by providing
policies that aim to make living in rural areas affordable
for all.
• The only important policies focus on investment in
R&D, technology and the knowledge economy.
• Environmental protection is tackled through regulation
and public investment.
• Environmental protection depends on market
mechanisms and the willingness to pay principle.
• Designated sites or regions receive strong protection. • Designated sites or regions receive moderate protection.
• Policy intervention aims to reduce landscape
fragmentation and urban sprawl.
• There is little intervention through spatial land use
planning.
• There are political initiatives to stimulate sustainable use
of resources and to prevent or adapt to environmental
impacts, e.g., forest fires, droughts, flooding etc.
• Market mechanisms are applied to the effective use of
resources and to help to prevent or adapt to environmental
effects, e.g., forest fires, droughts, flooding etc.
(con'd)
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• The EU implements climate change mitigation policies,
but outcomes are marginal by 2030 because of the inertia
in the climate system.
• The EU does not implement climate change mitigation
policies.
Governance
• The EU devolves political and financial responsibility to
the regions (the subsidiarity principle).
• Government is centralized and follows the principle of
nonintervention by privatizing national assets.
Intervention only occurs in situations where the market
fails.
• Rural development is governed by local authorities that
fund public participation and bottom-up initiatives.
• Rural development is steered by market forces.
Economy
• Public investment is used to underpin sustainable
development and regional self-sufficiency.
• Public investment is minimized and consequently
taxation is reduced.
• The EU budget is significantly increased as a proportion
of GDP. The additional resources are used to support
cohesion policy and payments to farmers for the provision
of public goods both of which discriminate strongly in
favor of poorer areas and social groups.
• Private investment is concentrated in the areas with the
greatest comparative advantage and this leads to regional
specialization in a global market place.
Technology
• There is substantial public investment in R&D and
infrastructure including ICT. There is major investment in
ICT infrastructure in rural areas providing new business
opportunities and improving accessibility.
• Technological development is driven by market-led,
private investment in regions with sufficient demand.
• There is moderate investment in agricultural
productivity.
• There will be considerable investment in agricultural
productivity, especially in regions with a comparative
advantage.
of positive outcomes, which we refer to as a high-
expectation world (HEW). Policies, societal trends,
and markets work out as expected and the social
values of its supporters are not compromised. A
detractor of the worldview believes that the assumed
positive outcomes will not be realized, resulting in
a low-expectation world (LEW). The societal and
economic developments, which are expected by the
supporter, do not work out. Furthermore, there are
“forgotten” trade-offs of a HEW, which
compromise the detractor’s social values. For
example, the pursuit of economic growth may lead
to environmental degradation, which may not be of
great concern to a Marketeer but be perceived as a
negative trade-off by others.
Although a HEW and LEW interpretation of the
Muskateer and Marketeer scenario principles could
be achieved through stakeholder consultation, we
made our interpretation based on the insights we
obtained in the two policy workshops and our expert
knowledge. We illustrate the extent to which
personal judgment could influence scenario
outcomes (Table 5). For example, in a Muskateer
HEW, strong governments lead to desired levels of
public services in rural regions, whereas in a LEW,
bureaucracy overwhelms efficient government and
regions exploit incoherent policies to their own
benefit. In the Marketeer HEW a lean government
allows a regional governance structure to emerge to
support public service provision on a demand basis,
whereas under a LEW, peripheral and poor regions
are disadvantaged and have little political influence,
resulting in inadequate service provision. The
complete results of this qualitative assessment are
illustrated for policy, governance, economic,
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Fig. 1. Five common stages of scenario development, based on the eight steps defined by Schwartz
(1998).
technology, societal, and environmental outcomes
(Table 5).
The difference between HEW and LEW outcomes
defines the judgment-related variation for each
scenario, which we term the belief range. When
traditional scenarios have single outcomes that are
easily compared, belief ranges can show partial or
complete overlap (Fig. 2). Although this may seem
complex compared to traditional explorative
storylines with just one interpretation for each
scenario, we argue that such results reflect political
reality on discussions of policy direction outcomes.
Furthermore, belief ranges provide valuable
insights into personal perceptions and thus form a
useful extension to existing scenario methods.
Despite the fact that our analysis is based on mental
models of potential outcomes, applying a consistent
logic helps to explore the extent to which personal
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Table 4. Trends of principal drivers affecting working and living in European rural regions under two
contrasting scenarios.
Categories of
drivers
Indirect driver Direct driver Muskateer Trend Marketeer Trend
Policy
International policy influence of the WTO subsidies, market
intervention
↓ no EU support
of WTO
↑ strong EU support
of WTO
agricultural production
policies
subsidies, tariffs, quota → no change ↓ abolished
rural development subsidies, restrictions,
market intervention
↑ increased ↓ abolished
environmental policy subsidies, restrictions,
market intervention
↑ strengthened ↓ weakened
cohesion policy investment ↑ increased ↓ abolished
National and
regional policies
policies for transport,
education, health, ICT
subsidies, investment,
restrictions
↑ increase ↓ less important
Governance
strength of subnational
government
regional infrastructure ↑ expanded → little expansion
rural support structures rural services ↑ expanded ↑ little expansion
political centralization ↓ decrease ↑ increase
Economy
Global economy economic development demand → stable GDP
growth
↑ rapid GDP growth
Technology
Technological
development
R&D spending yield and profit ↑ slow increase ↑ great increase
Investment in
infrastructure
infrastructure and
knowledge economies
access (transport, energy,
ICT, knowledge)
↑ uniform
increase
↑ increase in certain
regions
↑ = increasing trend, → = stable trend, ↓ = decreasing trend.
ICT = Information and communication technologies
Ecology and Society 15(2): 5
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss2/art5/
Table 5. High expectation world (HEW) and low expectation world (LEW) interpretations of the outcomes
of the scenario principles (Table 3).
Public intervention - Muskateer Market liberalization - Marketeer
Policy
HEW The influence of the WTO on EU policy is limited.
Cohesion policies are effective and enhance the vitality of
vulnerable rural regions. As a result, the competitiveness
of rural regions is increased and this buffers against
globalization trends.
The competitiveness and comparative advantage of
European regions in the world economy is greatly
enhanced. The WTO has a strong influence and this further
assists European trade within the global market place.
LEW Cohesion policies do not achieve their social and economic
goals because the cost of policy implementation is too
high. Furthermore, global influences are more strongly felt,
with the WTO restricting EU subsidies.
Social and economic inequalities arise from inadequate
policy support. Further liberalization of existing policy
structures proves impossible because of public concerns.
Governance
HEW Government is strong and effective leading to the desired
levels of public services. Income and regional inequalities
are reduced. This leads to a vibrant democracy and caring
communities.
A ‘lean’ government allows regional governance structures
to emerge to support public service provision on a demand
basis.
LEW Bureaucracy overwhelms efficient government and stifles
innovation. Individuals and regions exploit incoherent
policies for their own benefit, resulting in tensions and
conflicts between regions.
Peripheral and poor regions are disadvantaged and have
little political influence, resulting in inadequate service
provision. Richer regions dictate to poorer regions.
Economy
HEW Policy intervention leads to the convergence of GDP
between regions, resulting in a balanced spread of
economic functions (demand, supply, and employment)
and an expansion of the economic heart of Europe away
from the London-Milan axis. Remote and intermediate
rural areas are strengthened through the diversification of
economic activities. In some rural areas, the primary sector
remains an important part of the economy. Agricultural
abandonment is reduced and rural population decline is
stemmed by the creation of employment opportunities in
the secondary and tertiary sectors (e.g. agri-business,
services, information and communication technologies
[ICT], regional tourism).
Market led approaches and low taxation maximize
economic benefits and keep prices low. Higher economic
growth trickles down to the benefit of society as a whole,
including rural regions of Europe. The adjustment to lower
production costs in marginal regions increases the
competitiveness of agriculture and as a consequence there is
very little land abandonment. Regions diversify agricultural
and other activities in line with their comparative
advantages. Farmers either diversify or specialize their
business activities in response to their exposure to the
global market place. Tourism in peripheral regions benefits
from the greater mobility of richer people
LEW The high cost of intervention and subsidies leads to high
taxation, high costs (employment, transport etc.), and high
product prices. This leads to a lack of competitiveness in
global markets. The European economy lags behind the
rest of the world, with economic activities concentrating in
urban and peri-urban areas. Rural areas suffer high
unemployment and low incomes leading to land
abandonment and the stagnation of economic activities.
A lack of public investment leads to social and economic
inequality between regions and between cities and rural
areas. A large fraction of the food demand is met by
imports resulting in the relocation of agricultural production
to other parts of the world. Consequently, marginal
agricultural land is abandoned and rural unemployment is
high. Agricultural production intensifies in optimal areas.
Technology
HEW Technological development is spread equally across
Europe, including rural areas. Many public services are
transformed and delivered locally through ICT. The
accessibility of rural areas is greatly improved by public
investment in infrastructure such as the transport network
and ICT.
The rate of technological development is high because of
the success of private enterprise. Society at large benefits
from rapid technology transfer through market mechanisms.
(con'd)
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LEW Low technological development arises from a lack of
appropriate targeting (not market-led) of public
expenditure. Technology transfer is low and innovation is
stifled by the burden of bureaucracy.
Because of short term thinking, the market does not
adequately deliver technological innovation. The
developments that do occur are not available to everyone.
Investment in technology is concentrated in regions with a
comparative advantage.
Society
HEW Social values lead to local communities with strong
cohesion. There is an increased demand for regional goods
and services and agricultural land abandonment is low
because society is willing to pay a higher price for high
quality, local food. Farmers receive subsidies to provide
landscape services and environmental protection, leading
to an attractive countryside. Rural areas are a popular place
to live and agricultural abandonment is reduced.
There is strong competition between people, companies and
regions leading to a virtuous circle of investment,
technological development, and wealth creation. Society as
a whole benefits from the high economic growth with
profits being ploughed back into health, education, and
infrastructure. Rural areas flourish with enterprising
individuals creating new business opportunities and
employment. There is little agricultural abandonment.
LEW Free-riders, benefiting from society while seeking
maximum personal gain, cause tensions in society.
Although education levels are uniform, there are few
centers of excellence, and European social development
lags behind other parts of the world. People resent the
economic stagnation and the high prices they have to pay
for food and farmers become isolated from the wider
society. In some regions agricultural land is abandoned.
There are great inequalities between regions and social
groups. Income and service inequalities lead to high
migration between regions. People migrate from lagging
regions further reinforcing inequalities. Because young
people are more mobile, ageing in rural areas is reinforced.
In many regions marginal agricultural land is abandoned.
This leads to an increasing gap between the haves and the
have-nots causing tensions in society.
Environment
HEW Strong government regulation results in adequate
adaptation measures to cope with environmental impacts,
e.g., pollution, flooding, droughts, and forest fires.
Environmental pollution is diffuse and relatively low due
to both government regulation and more extensive
agricultural production strategies. There is public
investment in renewable energy to reduce carbon
emissions. Biodiversity is protected and managed for its
intrinsic value.
Market-based solutions ensure adequate adaptation
measures (e.g., insurance and technical innovation) to cope
with negative environmental effects, e.g., pollution,
flooding, droughts and forest fires. Pollution from
agriculture diminishes because farmers optimize chemical
inputs in an attempt to lower costs and boost profitability.
There is limited investment in renewable energy because
energy prices stabilize. Biodiversity is valued and managed
for the services it provides to society.
LEW In some regions, environmental effects, e.g., forest fires,
droughts, flooding etc. form serious risks in spite of the
political initiatives to adapt and attempts to mitigate carbon
emissions. Subsidies push up the price of land and other
agricultural production costs. Farmers respond by seeking
to maximize outputs through increased inputs.
Consequently, diffuse pollution (nitrates and pesticides)
from agriculture is a major problem. Intensive production
of bio-energy crops, especially in previously extensively
used regions, has negative consequences for biodiversity,
which continues to decline despite considerable effort.
In some regions, environmental issues such as forest fires,
droughts, flooding etc. form serious risks in spite of the
attempt to use market-based solutions to cope with
environmental problems. Forest fires are a problem in the
Mediterranean, where forest management policy is weak.
Regions with a comparative advantage intensify agricultural
production and this leads to environmental pollution
problems. Rising energy prices lead to a demand for bio-
energy, which competes with conventional agriculture on a
global market. In strong regions the pressures caused by
economic growth negatively affect biodiversity, whereas in
marginal regions there is little willingness to pay for
conservation because other issues are more pressing.
beliefs or worldviews can influence these outcomes.
Our results show that there is considerable overlap
in the belief ranges for the policy interventionist
Muskateer scenario and the market liberalization
Marketeer scenario (cf. Fig. 2b,c,d). A further
inspection of the HEW/LEW interpretations reveals
that although both scenarios result in positive
outcomes for the HEW, the risk of negative
outcomes appears greater in the market-led
scenario, because the interventionist measures
provides more buffering from external pressures by
investing public funds to avoid or limit negative
consequences. However, more quantitative methods
are required to explore the range of judgment-based
variation within each scenario, as discussed below.
Ecology and Society 15(2): 5
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss2/art5/
Fig. 2. The difference between high-expectation world (HEW) and low-expectation world (LEW)
scenario outcomes for a given indicator, i, define the belief range. Conceptual graphs illustrate possible
belief ranges for two alternative scenarios X and Y. Although belief ranges do not necessarily overlap
(a), partial (b) or complete (c,d) overlap are possible.
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DISCUSSION
Over recent decades, conventional scenario
methods have been used extensively to explore
future effects on climate, ecosystems, and the
services they provide (e.g., MA 2005, Schröter et
al. 2005, IPCC 2007). Scenarios have proved to be
successful in linking qualitative storylines to
quantitative models, providing numeric outcomes
for potential effects on ecology and society. When
the processes that are influenced by the storylines
are well understood and can be adequately
quantified, as with many biophysical and
macroeconomic processes, traditional methods for
interpreting scenario outcomes (Stage 5) work well.
However, when processes are less well understood,
as is the case in many social processes, interpretation
and judgment become more important.
The exercise presented here illustrates how personal
judgment can influence scenario outcomes. There
is a risk of developing fixed paradigms in scenario
development that ignore other possible outcomes
within the same storyline framework. This is an
important observation that, as far as we are aware,
has not yet received attention in the scenario
literature. Although ex ante policy impact
assessment tools (cf. Van Ittersum et al. 2008) are
useful for exploring short-term effects of specific
policy measures, explorative scenarios should span
a wide range of possible future outcomes to explore
medium to long-term effects on social-ecological
systems. Paradigms based on one interpretation of
a scenario create an artificial and undesirable limit
on the range of future worlds explored.
At first, it may seem confusing that alternative
scenario directions can result in similar outcomes
(cf. Fig. 2b,c,d). Our example shows that both policy
intervention and market liberalization can result in
positive or negative implications for rural regions.
However, the mechanisms leading to these
outcomes are different among scenarios. The HEW/
LEW concept forms a useful first step to tease out
these different processes. For example, in the
Muskateer HEW there is large public investment in
rural infrastructure, allowing public services to be
transformed and delivered through better transport
networks and information and communication
technologies, resulting in improved accessibility for
businesses. Conversely, in the Marketeer HEW,
technological development is high because of the
success of private enterprise, and rural society
benefits from rapid technology transfer through
market mechanisms. Such an analysis can lead to
further research to identify and quantify thresholds
for the success of both mechanisms.
It is a considerable challenge for the environmental
change modeling community to develop tools that
allow judgment to be made explicit. Ideally, the
HEW/LEW concept could be translated into
transparent quantitative models incorporating the
range of processes that could operate within the
same scenario. Such models could be informed by
open discussions with stakeholders and subsequently
explore the belief range for each scenario (cf. Fig.
2). However, existing numerical models (e.g., MNP
2006, Rounsevell et al. 2006, Verboom et al. 2007,
Verburg et al. 2010) are programmed to follow
predefined scenario interpretations of key drivers
and cannot be easily adapted for this purpose.
Developing tools that can incorporate judgment will
therefore form a considerable challenge for the
modeling community, requiring considerable
research investment.
CONCLUSIONS
Personal judgment and interpretation can greatly
influence scenario outcomes and can even lead to
the development of scenario paradigms that limit
the range of uncertainty that is covered by the
scenarios. It is of great importance to make these
judgments explicit in scenario development,
especially when exploring broad consequences of
alternative policy directions that may be based in
political worldviews. The HEW/LEW concept
outlined here provides a transparent framework for
identifying and understanding differences in
outcomes based on personal judgment. In addition,
it helps to tease out underlying processes that can
lead to these alternative outcomes. The ultimate
challenge will be to develop flexible quantitative
modeling techniques that are able to quantify
judgment-related variation for alternative scenarios
by incorporating multiple processes within the same
scenario.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss2/art5/responses/
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